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l[]ST PR~lJflLY~~ THE
by Miriam Lapp Azrael

Computer Matching Programs Are Turning
Uncle Sam Into Big Brother
IS-The Law Forum/Spring, I984

hen computer matching programs made headlines in 1981, I
privacy experts were shocked
that government agencies were swapping
personal data from separate computer
files for unrelated purposes and were
outraged to learn that the practice was
considered "routine."2

W

In 1982, a Senate subcommittee held
hearings to investigate computer matching. 3 The following June, a House
subcommittee also inquired into the
practice. 4 The House subcommittee's
final report, issued in November, 1983,
strongly criticized the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for its lax
oversight of computer matching programs and recommended strengthening
the Privacy Act of 1974 (the Act)5 to
shore up eroding privacy protections. 6
Representative Glenn English (D. Okla.),
Chairman of the House subcommittee
that issued the report, introduced H.R.
3743,7 which calls for the establishment
of an independent, non-partisan agency
to implement and enforce compliance
with the Privacy Act and to develop and
coordinate privacy protection policies.
This bill is still in committee. 8
Preserving the privacy of personal
information in the computer age is a
vexing problem that deserves immediate
attention. This article analyzes the
impact of computer matching programs
on protected rights of privacy and
recommends specific legislative solutions to limit privacy intrusions.

Overview
Before computers, information was
burdensome to record, quickly forgotten and usually inaccessible. With
modern technology, however, anyone
with the means and the inclination can
maintain in a single computer file the
equivalent of twenty single-spaced typed
pages, enough for a complete dossier,
on every man, woman and child in the
United States, and can retrieve information on any particular individual
within thirty seconds. 9 The government
does not now operate such an information system-not because it lacks the

technology to do so, but because the
idea of a centralized national data center
so shocked the public's consciousness
when Congress first considered the idea
in the mid-1960's, that the proposal has
never seriously been reconsidered. to
Today, congressional approval of the
idea is no longer necessary because
computer matching programs are creating a de facto national data center. ll
The computer files of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), the Social
Security Administration and the Census
Bureau already contain almost everything there is to know about most
American's finances, health and lifestyles. 12 Americans who regularly volunteer personal information about them-

Preserving the
privacy of personal
information in the
computer age is a
vexing problem that
deserves immediate
attention.
selves to government agencies are often
unaware of the fact that the government
uses this information for many purposes,
some of which are unrelated to those
for which the information was originally
gathered. For example, the IRS has
allowed the Selective Service System to
use computerized taxpayer files to
identify draft non-registrants. 13 Soon,
the Social Security Administration will
open its computer banks to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
to assist that agency in locating illegal
aliens. 14 Hundreds of computer matches
have already been conducted and more
are contemplated every day.15
Federal agencies also match their
computer records with computerized

records contammg personal information about Americans procured from
the private sector. The IRS has just
purchased from commercial marketing
firms computerized lists of American
households containing market research
proj ections of their estimated incomes. 16
In preliminary tests soon to be conducted, the IRS will match computerized
lists of two million income-producing
households in Wisconsin, Indiana,
Nevada and Brooklyn, N.Y. with IRS
lists of residents of those areas who
filed income tax returns for the year
1982. Individuals whose names appear
in the commercially prepared lists, but
not in the IRS' lists, will be targeted for
investigation. 17
The linkage of computer data banks
within the government and between the
public and private sectors raises a
number of questions: How can the
public be sure that the personal data
stored in government computer banks
and used in computer matches is both
current and accurate? Should government agencies be allowed common
access to personal information volunteered by individuals for purposes that
are unrelated to the objectives of a
proposed computer match? Can the
public prevent abusive and coercive
computer matches from occurring?
Congress sought to resolve these and
other questions when it passed the
Privacy Act of 1974, which prohibits
government agencies from disclosing
personal data retrieved from systems of
records without an individual's consent. 18
Although the Privacy Act does not
expressly mention computer matching,
its prohibitions apply to agencies that
disclose personal records for use in
computer matching programs. 19

ttRaw Hits" and Real People
Federal and state agencies use computer matching programs to detect
fraud and abuse in government benefit
programs. The process is ideally suited
for this purpose because it allows
administrators to rapidly compare data
contained in separate computer files to
identify inconsistencies or similarities
that might otherwise escape notice. In
1977, Joseph A. Califano Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW), in-
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augurated one of the first computer
matches, a program called "Project
Match," designed to identify federal
employees who were fraudulently obtaining welfare benefits. 20
In the pilot program (a test-run for
an eventual match of five million
federal employee records with welfare
records from twenty-six states 21 ), Secretary Califano matched HEW personnel
files with welfare rolls provided by the
District of Columbia. His goal was to
identify "hits"22-individuals listed in
both computer files. The initial match
identified 638 hits, or 638 HEW
employees who were also listed as
welfare recipients. Gainfully employed
people are generally ineligible for
welfare benefits. These 638 employees
were therefore automatically suspected
of welfare fraud. The unscreened hits,
or "raw hits," were targeted for
preliminary investigation, after which
480 (75%) were eliminated from
further scrutiny for various reasons.
The names of the remaining 158
employees (the "solid hits") were
forwarded to the Social Security Administration Integrity Staff for further
investigation. 23
20-The Law Forum/Spring, 1984
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computer match. Soon after, the
woman's friends called to tell her that
her name was listed in the newspapers,
as a welfare cheat.
Following her indictment, the woman's
court-appointed attorney advised her to
plead guilty. Before accepting her plea,
the trial judge asked her whether she had
ever told her social worker about her
job. When she replied that she had, the
judge immediately dismissed her case. 26

ecAT---

Eventually, fifteen welfare mothers
employed by HEW were indicted. No
one ever told these women prior to
their indictments that their names
appeared as "hits" in a computer
match; hence, they had no opportunity
to explain their circumstances before
Secretary Califano freely released their
names to the press. 24 Of the fifteen
indicted welfare mothers, five had their
cases dismissed and four had the
charges reduced to misdemeanors. The
remaining six pled guilty and were
sentenced to jail, but none had to serve
prison time. For all of its efforts, HEW
recovered less than $2,000. 25
One woman whose case was dismissed
was a former nursing student who
accepted welfare after she found out
that she had cervical cancer. After
months of cobalt treatment, she decided
to go back to work and found a job at
HEW. She immediately told her social
worker about her new job and was told
not to worry if she received a few more
welfare checks. When the checks kept
coming, the woman could not resist the
temptation to cash them to pay her
mounting medical bills. Then Project
Match identified her as a hit in its

As this case and the following case
illustrate, the identification of individuals
as "hits" in computer matches often
results in a presumption of their guilt,
requiring individuals to prove their
innocence.
In August, 1982, the Massachusetts
Department of Welfare conducted a
computer match to identify welfare
recipients who had cash assets in excess
of allowable limits. The Department
provided to 117 cooperating Massachusetts banks copies of computer files
containing social security numbers of
all welfare recipients in the state. The
banks were requested to electronically
match these social security numbers
against their customers' social security
numbers and bank balances to determine who on the list of welfare
recipients had bank account balances
that exceeded allowable limits. The
banks performed the match and afterwards returned lists of "raw hits."
Then, without conducting any prior
investigation, the Department sent out
termination notices to every welfare
recipient listed and referred their names
to the Bureau of Special Investigations
for fraud inquiry.27
One welfare recipient whose benefits
were terminated was a resident of a
nursing home whose bank account
contained a certificate of deposit which
she held in trust for a local funeral
director to pay the expenses of her own
funeral. 28 Another victim of this computer match was a woman who
maintained a joint bank account with
her brother, who was in the army.
Though her brother owned most of the
money in the account and the account
exceeded the allowable limit by only
$276, the Department still terminated
her benefits. The termination was
especially disturbing because she previously told her social worker about the
account, and her social worker "told
her not to worry about it. "29
The Massachusetts Department of
Welfare gave these welfare recipients
no opportunity to explain their particular situations, except at administrative

appeal hearings at which recipients had
the burden of proving that a mistake had
been made. Additionally, the Department failed to account for inaccuracies
in the computer data, such as transposed
social security numbers, that could have
mistakenly identified innocent people
as welfare cheats and caused the
erroneous termination of their benefits.
(A class action suit has been filed by
terminated welfare recipients to challenge
the state's conduct and is now pending
in a Massachusetts federal court. 30 )
Project Match and the Massachusetts
welfare/bank computer match are just
two of hundreds of computer matches
currently in progress or contemplated
by federal or state agencies. Both
matches utilized personal data disclosed
by individuals for purposes unrelated

Although shared
access to information
is an efficient use of
resources, expediency
must be balanced
against important
privacy
considerations.

to the objectives of the matches and
used this information without the
individuals' consent. Proponents praise
computer matching for streamlining
government benefit programs and saving taxpayers money. Inspector General
Richard F. Kusserow, of the Department of Health and Human Services,
calls computer matching a valuable
"auditing technique" that can be used
to "purify" a data base. 3!
Opponents of computer matching
programs criticize them for subjecting
innocent people to close government
scrutiny of their personal records
without any prior particularized suspicion of wrongdoing. Privacy experts call
computer matching a perversion of the
presumption of innocence and a violation of the public's expectation of
pri vacy in their personal records. 32 Yet,
computer matching is virtually unregulated. President Reagan zealously pro-

motes the use of computer matching
programs and advocates expanding
them. 33 The OMB (headed by David
Stockman, a Reagan appointee), has the
authority to oversee and issue guidelines
for computer matching programs, but
disclaims authority to prevent proposed
computer matches, even those that fail
to meet minimum legal requirements. 34
The situation has prompted Professor
David Linowes, former chairman of the
Privacy Protection Study Commission
that first recommended adoption of the
Privacy Act, to call computer matching
"the biggest threat to privacy today."35

Creation Of A De Facto
National Data Center
The federal government first began
computerizing its records soon after
World War II, when the Bureau of the
Census bought the first commercially
available computer. 36 Despite its headstart into the computer age, government
information systems are decentralized
and notoriously inefficient.37 In the
mid-1960's, the Bureau of the Budget
(now the OMB) sought to improve
efficiency by proposing the creation of
a centralized National Data Center that
"would maintain in a single computer
all of the statistical data accumulated by
scores of different federal agencies
about everyone in the United States."38
Some people thought this idea was
"eminently logical,"39 but others feared
that a national data center would lead to
uncontrolled intelligence gathering and
surveillance operations.
The threat to personal privacy
became hard to ignore once advocates
of the Center admitted that some data
would have to contain personal identifiers. 4o Soon, Congressmen, newspapers,
magazines, law reviews and popular
books all strongly criticized the idea.
Lacking public support, the National
Data Center proposal died in Congress
in 1965. A chief advocate of the
proposal has since conceded that its
failure to address privacy considerations
was a "gigantic oversight."4! In 1969,
privacy legislation was introduced into
Congress, but it was not until after the
Watergate scandals that Congress passed
the Privacy Act of 1974.
Like a national data center, computer
matching affords immediate access by
government agencies to vast quantities
of personal information. Although
shared access to information is an
efficient use of resources, expediency
must be balanced against important
privacy considerations. Professor Arthur

R. Miller, an authority on privacy
issues, writes that "when an individual
is deprived of control over the spigot
that governs the flow of information
pertaining to him, ... he becomes subservient to those people and institutions
that are able to manipulate it. "42 Thus,
unregulated expansion of the government's information gathering network
could shift the balance of power out of
the hands of the electorate and into the
hands of the government, which is
precisely the danger George Orwell
warned of in his book, I984.
There are also practical reasons why
the government should not pry into the
personal records of its citizens without
their consent. If Americans cannot trust
their government to respect their
informational privacy, then Americans
will no longer comply voluntarily with
the government's requests for personal
information. The collection of income
taxes, for example, which relies almost
entirely upon the public's voluntary
disclosure of confidential financial
information would be grossly undermined. Accordingly, both theoretical
and practical reasons exist for supporting privacy protection legislation.

HRecords" and HSystems of
Records" Under The Privacy
Act
By 1974, federal agencies had amassed
nearly three billion records on individuals
and maintained as few as SOO and as
many as 6,000 separate data banks. 43
Advances in computerized data systems
and their effect upon personal privacy
prompted Congress to enact the Privacy
Act. The Legislative History contains
the following references to computers:
(2) the increasing use of computers
and sophisticated information
technology, while essential to the
efficient operations of the government, has greatly magnified the
harm to individual privacy that
can occur from any collection,
maintenance, use or dissemination
of personal information.
(5) in order to protect the privacy
of individuals identified in information systems maintained by
federal agencies, it is necessary and
proper for the Congress to regulate
the collection, maintenance, use
and dissemination of information
by such agencies. 44
Under the Act, individuals may gain
access to their government files or to
Spring, 1984/The Law Forum-21

information pertaining to them in the
possession of a government agency and
may correct information that is inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely or incomplete. 45 In addition, the Act establishes
standards of conduct for the government's collection, maintenance, use and
disclosure of personal records. 46
The Act does not, however, apply to
all information maintained by government agencies. It only applies to those
records maintained within a system of
records. To qualify as a "record,"
information maintained by a government agency must contain a personal
identifier such as a person's name,
social security number "or other
identifying particular assigned the individual, such as a finger or voice print
or a photograph."47 To qualify as a
"system of records," the records must
be "retrieved" by a personalidentifier. 48
The government's disclosure of information that is neither a "record" nor
contained within a "system of records"
is unreviewable under the Act.
The leading case interpreting the
"system of records" definition is
Smiertka v. Department of Treasury,49 in
which the court held that the Privacy
Act is inapplicable where the particular
record disclosed was incapable of being
retrieved by the plaintiff's personal
identifier, even though it was retrievable
by other reasonable means. Smiertka, a
discharged IRS employee, sued the
Department of the Treasury to obtain
access under the Privacy Act to certain
daily investigation reports. These reports, prepared by IRS investigators as
routine summaries of their work,
contained references to the agency's
investigation of Smiertka that led to his
eventual discharge. The court upheld
the agency's denial of access to these
reports on the grounds that they were
not indexed according to Smiertka's
name or other personal identifier. The
fact that they could be retrieved easily
by the name of the investigator who
wrote the reports was "wholly beside
the point."50
The holding in Smiertka was explained
in Savarese v. U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, 51 in which the
court reasoned that if it upheld a
Privacy Act claim where the disclosure
did not result from the retrieval of
plaintiff's records from within a system
of records, then
no government employee could
utter a single word concerning any
person without first reviewing all
systems of records within the
22-The Law Forum/Spring, I984

agency to determine whether or
not the information in question
was contained therein .... It borders
on the absurd to contend that all
officals should have a pansophic
recall concerning every record
within every system of records
within the agency.sz
Recent cases have followed this
analysis. In one particularly troubling
case, Olberdung v. U.S. Department of
Defense,53 decided in June, 1983, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
upheld the lower court's dismissal of
the plaintiff's Privacy Act claim on the
grounds that the Army General who
disclosed the plaintiff's psychiatric test
results, without the plaintiff's consent,
, recalled the information from his own
memory and did not retrieve the
information from a "system of records."
The fact that the test results could have
been retrieved from the Madigan Army

As a threshold test
for bringing agency
conduct within the
scope of the Privacy
Act, the Usystem of
records" definition is
too narrow.

Medical Center's system of records
which indexed the records according to
the plaintiff's name was held to be
immaterial.
This case illustrates the inadequacy
of the "system of records" definition.
The object of the Privacy Act is to
protect the privacy of individuals. An
unauthorized disclosure of personal
information invades an individual's
privacy regardless of the manner in
which the information is retrieved. An
individual whose psychiatric test results
are disclosed without his prior consent
suffers no less of a loss of privacy when
these records are retrieved from a
system of records, than when they are
recollected from a bureaucrat's own
memory.
As a threshold test for bringing
agency conduct within the scope of the
Privacy Act, the "system of records"
definition is too narrow. It freely

exempts invasive disclosures on purely
mechanical grounds. But assuming that
an agency's recordkeeping has passed
through this narrow hoop, its conduct
may still escape Privacy Act scrutiny
through the trapdoor of one of the
Act's twelve exceptions. 54
One such exception is the "routine
use" exception. 55 The term "routine
use" is defined as "the use of [a] record
for a purpose which is compatible with
the purpose for which it was collected"
[emphasis added]. 56 Agencies are required
to publish annual notices in the Federal
Register describing each routine use of
records contained within each system
of records. This notice must indicate
the purpose for each purported routine
use and the categories of each user.57
Privacy experts express grave concern
over the breadth of~this exception and
over the fact that the twelve exceptions
have all but swallowed up the general
rule that prohibits non-consensual
disclosures of personal information. 58
Moreover, the courts have not critically
analyzed the application of this exception
in particular circumstances. In Parks v.
I.R.s.,59 for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
an agency's non-consensual disclosure
of the identities of employees who
contributed to savings bond solicitations
was not a "routine use" of agency
information, not because the purported
routine use failed to meet substantive
definitional requirements, but rather
because the agency failed to publish a
notice in the Federal Register. Privacy
experts wonder whether all an agency
need do is publish Federal Register
notices to qualify their disclosures of
personal information under the "routine
use" exception to escape Privacy Act
compliance. 6o John H. Shattuck, National Legislative Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, is concerned
that the test of "compatibility" under
the "routine use" exception has become
so elastic that it is now virtually
ignored. In his prepared statement
submitted to Rep. Glenn English's
House subcommittee in June, 1983,
Mr. Shattuck commented that "[i]n
practice, 'routine use' has come to
mean any use which an agency deems to
be appropriate. So long as a 'notice of
routine use' is published in the Federal
Register, just about anything goes."61

Computer Matching Under
The Privacy Act
The Privacy Act does not specifically
mention computer matching, and as

yet, there is no body of case law on the
subject. If computer matches were
subject to the Privacy Act, agencies
would have to notify and obtain the
prior written consent of all individuals
whose computer records were involved
in any computer matching program. 62
The time and expense involved would
be prohibitive. In Project Match, for
example, the data base of just one of the
computer files involved in the match
contained the records of two million
individuals. 63 Certainly, if computer
matching did not fall within one of the
exceptions to the Privacy Act, it would
come to an abrupt halt.
Proponents of computer matching do
all they can to ensure that computer
matching programs are exempt from
Privacy Act disclosure requirements. In
Computer Matching Guidelines promulgated by the OMB in 1975 and
overhauled by the Reagan administration
in 1982,64 agency disclosures of personal
records to conduct computer matches
is a permissible routine use of agency
records. 6s The OMB does not, however,
enforce the substantive requirements to
qualify disclosures under this exception.
Lax enforcement troubles even those
who advocate computer matching.
In December, 1982, Thomas F.
McBride, Associate Dean of Stanford
Law School and Former Inspector
General of the u.S. Department of
Labor, testified before a Senate subcommittee investigating computer
matching programs and candidly admitted that
I have always been somewhat
baffled by what seems to me to be
a somewhat illusory protection,
the routine use clause of the
Privacy Act. Basically, what those
[agencies] conducting matches
have done, those subject to the
Privacy Act, is to publish notice
and add the match as a routine use
[of agency records], even though
it did not seem to have a clear
nexus to the purpose for which
the data was originally collected ....
I've often been puzzled as to
whether there is some distortion
of the intention of the legislation.
Routine use has become pro
forma. 66
Six months later, Christopher DeMuth,
OMB Administrator for Information
and Regulatory Affairs, testified before
Rep. English's House subcommittee
and shocked Rep. English by revealing

that the OMB essentially rubberstamps
agencies' purported routine uses, thus
confirming former Inspector General
McBride's observations. When asked
by Rep. English whether qualifying as a
routine use had any substantive element
apart from the procedural requirement
of publishing Federal Register notices,
Mr. DeMuth replied that
[a]gencies come to us [OMB] and
ask us about specific systems [of
records] and how [their proposed
routine use] fits within the law.
They describe to us their programs
and the nature of information and
what kinds of uses were made of it
in the past. We try to settle these
things on a case-by-case basis. We
do not have any authority to say yes
or no as to a given routine use
[emphasis added]. 67

ttln practice, troutine
use' has come to
mean any use which
an agency deems to
be appropriate. So
long as a tnotice of
routine use' is
published in the
Federal Register, just
about anything
goes."
Later in his testimony he added
My understandings of the Privacy
Act and OMB's regulatory
authority under the act is that it
does not give us the authority to
tell an agency head or any agency's
senior Privacy Act official that a
certain use would not fit within
the routine use definition of the
act ... - to overrule the agency
official administratively. Routine
use determinations are given to
the agency head ultimately under
the act ... [ we] cannot deny routine
uses [emphasis added]. 68
If OMB, which is authorized to
oversee implementation of the Privacy
Act, is not effectively policing compliance with its substantive requirements,

then who is? The answer is, unfortunately,
no one. Enforcement, such as it is, is left
entirely up to the public.

Recovery Under The Privacy
Act
To recover under the Act for an
agency's unauthorized disclosure of
personal information, whether in the
course of computer matching or otherwise, an individual must establish that:
(1) the agency acted intentionally
or willfully;69
(2) he thereby sustained an "adverse effect"; 70 and
(3) he suffered an out-of-pocket
loss. (Courts have limited recovery to out-of-pocket losses
for physical injuries only; emotional or mental injuries are
non-compensable. 71)
John Shattuck says that "short of
proving that one has been mutilated by
a government computer," this damage
requirement is impossible to meet.
Thus, plaintiffs who bring Privacy Act
claims seldom recover damages. 72
Apart from the difficulty of proving
damages, the Act is unenforceable
because it fails to provide injunctive
relief for wrongful disclosure. In other
words, an individual who wishes to
challenge the Internal Revenue Service's
disclosure of his tax return information
to the Selective Service System for a
computer match to identify draft nonregistrants can do nothing to prevent
the computer match from occurring.
His only remedy is to collect damages
after the match has been conducted and
after his privacy has been violated, and
then, only if he can establish the three
elements listed above.

Recommendations For Privacy
Act Reform
To prevent further erosion of the
privacy protections Congress sought to
implement under the Privacy Act,
Congress should:

1. Pass H.R. 3743,73 which calls for
the creation of an independent, nonpartisan, permanent Privacy Protection
Commission to develop and coordinate
privacy protection policies and oversee
compliance with the Privacy Act.
2. Limit and refine the definition of
"routine use" to prohibit the government's unauthorized use of personal
information for any purpose that is
inconsistent with the reasonable exSpring, 1984/The Law Forum-23

pectations of individuals whom the
government asks to disclose personal
information.
3. Provide Injunctive relief for
wrongful disclosures even where no
"adverse effect" results from the
disclosure.
4. Require that all agencies conducting
computer matches publicly disclose (i)
a costlbenefit analysis prior to the
match, (ii) a description of all records
to be compared in the match, and (iii)
the basis for determining that the
objectives of the match are compatible
with the purposes for which the
information was originally collected
and the reasonable expectations of the
parties from whom the information was
collected.

Conclusion
Computer matching is a tool; it is not
evil in itself. Like any tool, its potential
for harm rests in the sound discretion

Many bureaucrats
believe that uonly
those who have
something to hide"
care about
safeguarding the
privacy of their
personal records.
of its user. In enacting the Privacy Act,
Congress sought to limit the government's discretion in its use and
handling of personal information. Unfortunately, as it is presently interpreted, the Act falls short of accomplishing this goal.
Many bureaucrats believe that "only
those who have something to hide" care
about safeguarding the privacy of their
personal records. 74 Proponents of computer matching, many of whom share
this view, have come to regard the
Privacy Act as a regulatory inconvenience that stands in the way of fiscal
efficiency. Administrators who disagree
with the objectives of the Privacy Act
have craftily devised ways of getting
around it. Courts have altogether
ignored the spirit of the Act and
24-The Law Forum/Spring, 1984

enforce only its procedural requirements. If computer matching is permitted to continue unchecked, the
government will soon have at its
disposal the resources of a national data
center and the license to use personal
information stored within its data
banks as a means of political coercion.
The increasing dilution of informational privacy protection in this country
also has international implications that
few people realize. Recently, the Council of Europe sent a directive to the
Reagan administration suggesting that
transborder data flows may be interrupted or "seriously restricted," unless
the United States implements stronger
privacy protection at the national level.
The Reagan administration has responded
by stating that "[ t ]he U.S. legal
structure provides adequate safeguards
[sic] protection of personal privacy."75
Considering the total abdication by the
OMB of its oversight authority under
the Privacy Act and the concurrent
pressure by the Reagan administration
to expand computer matching of
unrelated personal information, this
statement is indefensible. If those in
power consider current privacy protections to be "adequate," then George
Orwell's predictions for 1984 are more
accurate than we think. W
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